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Voting on the Budget Deficit: Comment 

During the 1970's and 1980's, many OECD tertemporal choices. If the budget deficit were 
countries have experienced excessively high chosen behind a "veil of ignorance," policy 
budget deficits, resulting in a huge increase in makers would unanimously choose a lower 
government debt. Growing concerns about the budget deficit. For this reason, TA plead for 
effects of high government debt, and the ap- institutional arrangements which separate inter- 
parent inability of policy makers to make the temporal choices from decisions concerning the 
necessary budgetary adjustments, gave rise to allocation of resources within any given period. 
a discussion about the appropriateness of Such arrangements would prevent policy mak- 
fiscal rules which would constrain fiscallv ers from running budget deficits for strategic 
irresponsible policy makers. In the uniteb purposes. 
States, there has been a lively debate on the Though TA's analysis focuses on budget 
balanced-budget amendment. In Europe, fis- deficits, the basic idea behind their model can 
cal rules, restricting the level of the budget be applied to any other variable which can be 
deficit and government debt, have been used to affect future policies. An obvious 
adopted in the Maastricht Treaty, as precon- candidate is public investment, as public in- 
dition for the admission of a countrv to the vestment today affects future resources. In 
monetary union. Similar rules have been this Comment we discuss a simple model in 
adopted in the "Stability and Growth Pact." which the current policy maker affects her 
These rules are intended to restrict policy successor's policies by both her choice of the 
makers in admitted countries to run excessive budget defiiit and her choice of the level of 
budget deficits after the start of EMU. public investment. In the spirit of the TA 
In an influential paper in this Review,Guido model, we assume disagreement between the 
Tabellini and Alberto Alesina (1990), hence- current and future policy maker about the 
forth TA, provide an appealing rationale for composition of consumption. We show 
such fiscal rules. They show that policy makers that without a binding constraint on the bud- 
have an incentive to run an excessively high get deficit, public investment is set at its so- 
budget deficit if they are uncertain about fuGre cially optimal level while the budget deficit is 
policy makers' preferences over the composi- excessively high. A binding rule on the level 
tion of public spending. The idea behind their of the deficit eliminates excessive borrowing, 
result is simple. A budget deficit enables the as in TA, but induces the current policy maker 
current policy maker to spend more on goods to spend too little on public investment. Ef- 
which she likes, while it limits spending of her fectively, by removing one distortion the pol- 
successor on goods which she likes less. The icy maker is led to create another, possibly 
strategic interaction between the current policy more costly, distortion. ~ o n s e ~ u e n t l ~ i  a bind- 
maker and her successor distorts society's in- ing debt rule may be ex ante inefficient.' 
The analysis is highly relevant for the still 
ongoing discussion about fiscal rules in Europe 
* Peletier: J.P. Morgan, Structured Products Group, and the United States. In a recent paper on the 
London, 60 Victoria Embankment, London EC4Y OJP, pros cons the Stability Pact, Barryand of
United Kingdom (e-mail: Peletier-Ben@JPMorgan.com); 
Dur and Swank: Tinbergen Institute and Research Centre Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz (1998) men- 
for Economic Policy (Ocfeb), Erasmus University, P.O. tion as an objection to a binding debt rule that it 
Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands (e-mail: 
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support by the Erasmus University through Impulsgelden is ex ante efficient if before knowing the preferences of the 
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are not representative of the views of J.P. Morgan. mal. 
137'7 
1378 THE AMERlCAiV ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 1099 
suppresses symptoms without curing the $is- 
ease. However, they conclude: "If excessive 
deficits can be prevented only by using the Ell 's 
authority to impose a credible external con-
straint, there is no reason not to try." We argue 
that there is a good reason not to try. An exter- 
nal credible constraint creates another, possibly 
more costlv. distortion. In order to eliminate the 
> .  
political distortions, fiscal rules should apply to 
all policy areas which may affect future re-
sources. An incomplete set of rules may do 
more harm than good. A step in the right direc- 
tion seems to be to add a rule for public invest- 
ment, or to allow policy makers to borrow for 
public investment (cf., Nouriel Roubini, 1995). 
However, the difficulties in precisely defining 
public investment will render such an additional 
rule either too strict or too soft. Moreover, there 
may be still other ways to soften the budget 
constraint at the expense of future resources, for 
example spending less on durable public con- 
sumption. 
Our analysis hinges on the idea that budget- 
ary institutions matter, not only for deficits, but 
also for public investment. Unfortunately, there 
exists little direct evidence on the effects of 
budgetary institutions on public investment. 
The reason for this lack of evidence is twofold. 
First, budgetary innovations are scarce and pos- 
sibly endogenous. Second, cross-national com- 
parisons are hampered by nonbudgetargr 
differences between countries. James M. Pot-
erba (1995) circumvents these problems, at least 
to some extent, by using the variation in budget 
practices across U.S. states to examine the ef- 
fects of budgetary rules on public investment. 
Consistent with the result of our model, Poterba 
finds that states which are not allowed to finance 
capital spending by future revenues spend less 
on capital goods. 
There exists more indirect evidence on the 
effects of budgetary practices on public in- 
vestment. Jakob de Haan et al. (1996) find 
that public investment is often reduced in 
periods of restrictive fiscal policies and fiscal 
consolidation (see also Roubini and Jeffrey 
Sachs, 1989). Alesina and Silvia Ardagna 
(1998) present data of fiscal and macroeco- 
nomic variables around successful and unsuc- 
cessful fiscal adjustments in OECD countries 
for the period 1960-1994. They show that in 
the twi years after a successful adjustment 
public investment in share of GDP is o r r  av-. 
erage 16 percent lower than in the two years 
before the adjustment. 'rona the expendittrre 
categories considered (transfers, government 
wages, nonwages consenmption, and govern-. 
ment investment) this is by far the largest 
reduction. To compare, in the two years after 
a successful adjustment transfers in share of 
GDP is on average less than 4 percent lower 
than in the two years before the ad~justment. 
The decline in public investment after a suc- 
cessful fiscal adjustment was even more dra- 
matic in countries which had very high debt 
levels, presumably the countries which were 
most biased towards excessive budget defi-. 
cits. In Belgium, public investment in share of 
GDP was reduced by 40 percent (1986---
1987)- in Ireland it was reduced by 29 percent 
(1985-19861, and in Italy it was reduced hy 
27 percent (1 994 -1 995). Interestingly, nei -
ther in Belgium nor in Ireland public invest-. 
ment in share of GDP has increased after the 
fiscal adjustments. 
It is worth emphasizing that this Comment 
does not question the importance of TA9s 
analysis. On the contrary, in our model the 
reason why policy makers may invest too 
little is essentially the same as the reason why 
in the TA model policy makers run excessive 
budget deficits. However, our results do cast 
doubt on their policy recommendation for in- 
stitutional arrangements which prevent policy 
makers from running budget deficits for stra- 
tegic purposes. Furthermore, our model pro- 
vides an explanation for the observation tbac 
public investment is often reduced in periods 
of restrictive fiscal policies and fiscal consol- 
idation. 
I. The Augmented Model 
In TA, a group of heterogeneous iradividm.. 
als is endowed with one unit of output per 
period. The world lasts two periods. In each 
period the median voter decides on how to 
spend this endowment on the consumption of 
two public goods, denoted g and f .  In period 
1 the group can borrow or lend to the rest of 
the world at a given real interest rate which is 
assumed to be 0. lm period 2 all the outstand- 
ing debt has to be repaid. The median voter of 
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the group is characterized by the following tion problem faced by the median voter in pe- 
utility function: riod 2: 
where E(.) is the expectation operator, and 
4 . )  is concave, strictly increasing, twice con- 
tinuously differentiable, and satisfies the con- 
ditions u(0) = O and uf(0)  ---+ m. An 
important feature of the model is that the 
identity of the median voter need not be the 
same in period 1 and 2. The parameters a? 
and a? identify the median voter in period 1 
and period 2, respectively. Both a? and a? 
lie in the interval [0, 11. 
We augment the TA model by giving the 
group in period 1 the opportunity to invest an 
amount of k, which yields additional resources 
in period 2 of amount h(k,). To ensure an 
interior solution, we assume that h' (k,) > 0 
and hU(kl) < 0, i.e., decreasing returns to 
investment, and h' (0) > 1. The group faces the 
following intertemporal budget constraint: 
where b, denotes debt. In equation (2a) ko is 
the socially optimal amount of public invest- 
ment [i.e., hf(k0) = I]. We add h(ko) + ko 
to the initial resources to rule out tax smooth- 
ing as a reason for running a deficit in period 
1. This facilitates an elegant exposition of the 
results. 
Our model differs from the TA model in one 
respect. In our model there are two ways, rather 
than one way, in which the current majority can 
influence the future majority's decisions. Equa- 
tion (2) clearly reveals that both the amount of 
public debt and the level of public investment in 
period 1have an effect on the size of the future 
budget. 
11. Equilibrium Without a Balanced-Budget 
Rule 
In order to ensure a time-consistent policy, 
we start the analysis with solving the optimiza- 
subject to (2b). Substituting (2b) into (3), and 
maximizing with respect to g,, yields the fol- 
lowing first-order condition: 
-- b, - g,) = 0. 
Equation (4) and the budget constraint (2b) to- 
gether inlplicitly define the equilibrium values 
g; andf as a function of the preferences of the 
median voter in period 2, the level of public 
debt, and the level of public investment. Denot- 
ing these functions as G(a7, b,, k,) and F(a?, 
b,, k,), respectively, it is straightforward to 
derive that: 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
The median voter in period 1 takes into ac- 
count the effect of her choice of b, and k, on 
the decisions made by the median voter in pe- 
riod 2. Using (2a), the optimization problem can 
be written as: 
Since the identity of the median voter in period 
2 is uncertain, the expectation operator in (6) is 
taken with respect to a?. The first-order condi- 
tions are: 
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(7) a ; "u l ( g , )- (1 - a ; " ) u l ( l+ h(k , )  
i- ( I  -- a;")ur(F'(a;', b , ,  k,))F',] = 0 
+ (1 - a;")uf(di(al;,b, ,k,))F,hf(k,)J= 0 
where we have used G, = - - h f ( k 1jG, and 
F, = - h l ( k , ) F ,  [see equation ( 31 .  From 
equations ( 8 )  and (9 )  it directly follows that 
h' ( k , )  .= 1 .  Hence, public investment is set at 
its soclally optimal level. Public debt is then 
determined by the solution to equations (7) and 
(89, which are similar to the first-order condi- 
tions (5) and (6) in the original TA model. 
Hence, all their results hold in the augmented 
model. In particular, (7) and (8 )  imply that if 
there is a positive probability that a ;  Z a;", the 
median voter will run an excessively high bud- 
get deficit. Moreover, the optimal level of the 
deficit increases with the difference between a? 
and the expected value of a;. Thus, the more 
polarized are the current and future majorities, 
the higher is the level of the budget deficit. A 
balanced budget is chosen when there is no 
disagreement between the current and the future 
majority (i.e., a ;  = a? with certainty). Hence, 
as in TA, budget deficits only arise for strategic 
reasons. 
htexstingly, in the discretionary equilibrium 
public investment is not used strategically. The 
intuition is straigh~omad. The median voter in 
period 1 can soften its budget constraint at the 
expense of future resources in two ways: by ma-a-
ning a budget deficit and by reducing public in-
vestment to a level below the socially opGn~d 
e r u d g  a budget deficit reduces re- 
sources in period 2 proportionally, lowering pub- 
lic investment affects future resources more than 
groportiondly since hl(k,)  > B for values of k,  
below the socially optimal mount. Hence, with 
complete discretion over the level of the deficit, 
the median voter will not use public investment 
strategically. 
111. Consequences of a Balanced-Budget Role 
We now turn to the second main result sf  TA: 
a balanced-budget rule is ex ante efficient."his 
result is, however, obtained in a model without 
public investment. We will now analyze what 
happens if public investment is included. 
When a balanced-budget rule is imposed (im-
plying b l  =: O), first-order condition (8) no 
longer holds. Only first--order conditions (7) and 
(9) remain. Given that a positive level of debt is 
optimal in the discretionary equilibrium, under 
a balanced-budget rule we have that the expres- 
sion in (8) is positive (i.e,, the marginal benefit 
of higher public debt exceeds marginal costs). 
Knowing this, it is easy to see that condition (9) 
requires h ' ( k ,j > I .  Hence, a balanced-budget 
mle induces the median voter to invest too little. 
Clearly, a balanced-budget rule does not 
solve the problem of inteatemporal strategic be- 
havior. In order to reach the ex ante efficient 
state, an additional rule for the Bevel of invest- 
ment has to be implemented. Unfortunately, 
such a solution poses at least three new prob- 
lems. First, there is the problem of detemining 
the optimal level of investment. Obviously, our 
model is far too simple for such a task. But even 
in a more general setting, it will n d  be easy to 
find a reliable estimate of the optimal invest- 
ment level, particular-ly when that level changes 
over time.3 The second problem is that public 
investment exists in widely varying forms, of 
which some are not easily quantifiable. A well-
known example is investment in human capital. 
Finally, and perhaps most impoaar~tly, once a 
balanced-budget rule and a public investmeaat 
mle are imposed, governments will seek alter- 
native ways to soften their own budget con. 
straint. For example, when durable expenditures 
are introduced into our model on which all 
individuals agree, a balanced-budget mle and an 
investment rule induce governments to spend 
TA do, however, stress an important downside of a 
balanced-budget rule: the fact that it greatly reduces the 
flexibility with which to respond to unexpccted shocks. Our 
point is that cven in the absence of such shocks, or with a 
state-contingent budget rule, a balanced-budget rule will 
have a negative effect, namely underinvestment. 
'The "Golden Rule of Government Finance" (i.e., the 
permitted level of the budget deficit is equal to the level of 
public investment) may overcome this problem. See Chap- 
ter 2 in Dur (2000). 
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too little on durable consumption goods (PeWe- 
tier et al., 1997). 
Even if it is not immediately possible to reach 
the ex ante efficient state, the question remains 
whether a balanced-budget rule, or an incomplete 
set of rules, is preferable to no rule at all? As it 
turns out, the answer is no, not in general. In 
Peletier et al. (1997) simulations are presented 
which show that it can go both ways: in some 
cases, a balanced-budget rule increa$es ex ante 
utility, whereas in other cases, it lowers it. This 
essentially reflects the fact that a balanced-budget 
rule has two opposing effects: first, it takes away 
an instrument that is used to increase current 
spending relative to future spending. This, ceteris 
paribus, raises ex ante utility, a7 all voters ex ante 
would prefer spending to be smoothed over both 
periods. Second, it causes public investment in 
period 1 to drop. This, ceteris paribus, lowers 
utility, a7 voters ex ante would prefer a higher 
level of investment in that period. Which of these 
two effects dominates depends on the exact spec- 
ification of the utility functions. 
IV. Conclusion 
In this Comment, we have argued that a bal- 
anced-budget rule may cause underinvestment. As 
a consequence, such a rule is not ex ante efficient: 
in order to achieve the ex ante optimal outcome, it 
would be necessary to add an extra rule for the 
level of public investment. Unfortunately, how- 
ever, such an investment rule is likely to be very 
difficult to implement in practice. When there are 
no rules to prevent underinvestment, it is no 
longer clear whether a balanced-budget rule is 
beneficial or not. In some cases, the costs of Bow 
levels of investment outweigh the benefits of a 
balanced budget. 
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